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ABSTRACT 
The declaration on religious freedom issued by the Second Vatican Coun-
cil, Dignitatis Humanae claimed: «the human person has a right to reli-
gious freedom» (no. 2). Nevertheless, some think the modern declaration 
of Vatican II contradicts prior Catholic magisterial teaching on religious 
liberty. I evaluate whether the Magisterium is proposing an inconsistent 
set of propositions. I argue that a careful reading of the relevant magis-
terial propositions from classical papal encyclicals, namely, those that ap-
parently opposed religious freedom, reveals they do not contradict any 
of the propositions concerning religious freedom in the declaration of 
Vatican II. While proving the absence of a contradiction does not prove 
that the teaching is true or plausible, there is value in doing so because 
it allows Catholic theologians to focus on demonstrating that the propo-
sitions proposed by the Magisterium are jointly plausible and to propose 
consistent explanations in which both sets of propositions figure. 
T HE declaration on religious freedom issued by the Second Vatican Council, Dignitatis Humanae forthrightly claimed: «the human 
person has a right to religious freedom» (no. 2).1 Despite actually having 
signed the declaration while a participant at Vatican II, Marcel Lefebvre 
* Contact: Largo Angelicum 1, 00184, Roma, Italia.
1. SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, Declaration Dignitatis Humanae, 1, 
«AAS» 58 (1966), pp. 929–946. Translation taken from http://www.vatican.va/archiv 
e/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis 
-humanae_en.html [accessed 11 August 2020].
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later famously claimed: «The phrase of the schema quoted in the inter-
vention [ibid.] is monstrous, and it is odious to credit the Catholic 
Church with this claim».2 When Marcel Lefebvre embarked on his schis-
matic path in ordaining bishops without papal mandate, his justifica-
tion, in great part, rested on the claim that there was a contradiction 
between the teaching proposed at Vatican II and that proposed in clas-
sical papal encyclicals. Lefebvre held that earlier Catholic teaching on 
the duties of States and freedom of religion were directly opposed to 
this claim in Dignitatis Humanae and, in fact, formally contradicted it. 
This view that there exists a contradiction between this more recent 
declaration of Vatican II and the prior teaching has recently resurfaced 
among some Catholics, although mostly in popular media rather than 
scholarly contexts.  
In this article, I evaluate whether Dignitatis Humanae has embroiled 
Catholic social teaching in proposing an inconsistent set of proposi-
tions. Specifically, I aim to examine the compatibility of the teaching in 
Dignitatis Humanae alongside propositions proposed by three classical 
papal encyclicals (Quanta Cura, Mirari Vos, Immortale Dei) which ap-
parently condemn the existence of rights to religious freedom or, more 
strongly, claim that every State is morally obliged to establish the 
Catholic Church and enforce Catholic doctrinal views by civil penalties. 
I am not qualified to explain the history of the second Vatican Council 
or the development of Catholic social teaching on the State, and so I 
will not exposit the historical context of the encyclicals in any signifi-
cant detail. Rather, I will focus exclusively on what are taken to be the 
doctrinal propositions proposed by these encyclicals and interpret these 
in a straightforward way. The upshot of this flatfooted approach is that, 
if no subtlety in exposition or historical nuance is required for seeing 
that the doctrinal propositions of Vatican II and the classical encyclicals 
are consistent, then at least the burden has been shifted to those who 
claim that there does exist a contradiction in the teaching. And, in fact, 
the claim that such a contradiction exists would then only be as plau-
sible as the subtle exposition required to make sense of the objector’s 
position, whereas a principle of charitable interpretation would give us 
2. M. LEFEBRVE, I Accuse the Council, Angelus Press, Saint Mary’s, KS 1998, p. 27. 
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sufficient grounds to read Catholic magisterial teaching in the obvious 
and straightforwardly consistent way proposed here.  
There have been four popular strategies for approaching this prob-
lem. The first two avoid the problems entirely. The first of these is some-
thing approaching psychological denial. One might argue that there is 
no need for consistency in magisterial teaching and thus no theological 
problem with the magisterium proposing two inconsistent and doctri-
nally-binding sets of propositions. On this first view, the new teaching 
of Dignitatis Humanae simply “changed” the prior teaching and there’s 
nothing more to it. Such a position seems, in my view, to accept a faulty 
understanding of how Catholic magisterial teaching is supposed to 
work. It has the additional fault of being a non-explanation, as we 
would not be convinced that the Catholic Magisterium were consistent 
if it proposed (for example) Nicene orthodoxy one day and Unitarian-
ism on the next.3 I will not pursue the problems with this position and 
instead assume without argument that its picture of Catholic magiste-
rial teaching is false. The second strategy involves denying that the for-
mer teaching on Church and State was ever truly magisterial (in the 
sense of an infallible teaching).4 Again, this strategy involves one in a 
complicated discussion of what is involved in authoritative magisterial 
teaching that, as I hope to show, is unnecessary.  
3. For a fuller exposition of contemporary theology on the Magisterium that does 
not agree with the first strategy, see A. DULLES, Magisterium: Teacher and Guardian of 
the Faith, Sapientia Press, Ave Maria, FL 2010. 
4. This might include M. RHONHEIMER, Benedict XVI’s “Hermeneutic of Reform” and 
Religious Freedom, «Nova et Vetera», English edition, 9/4 (2011), pp. 1029–1054. I take it 
Rhonheimer is claiming that prior teaching, in the relevant aspects, contradicted latter 
teaching at Vatican II, but this was unproblematic because there is «the distinction be-
tween two levels: on the one hand, the level of the principles of the doctrine of the 
Catholic faith; on the other hand, that of their concrete historical application …» (1038). 
He also claims: «The contradiction arises only at the level of the assertion of the civil 
right, and is therefore only of the political order. […] at the level of natural law’s legal-
political application in situations and in the face of concrete problems» (1042). That is 
to say the prior teaching, when it contradicts the latter teaching, only does so insofar 
as it touches historical application. Then, as the Church’s magisterium is not infallible 
in teaching about historical applications of its doctrine, the earlier teaching can be false 
or (as on the strategy of Journet and Maritain) have ceased to be applicable.
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A third strategy involves restricting the infallibility of prior magis-
terial teaching to some particular historical circumstances. For example, 
it might be claimed that the earlier teaching only addressed a situation 
under which the majority of citizens were Catholic. While, in these 
regimes, there was an obligation by the State to enforce the Catholic 
faith — as held by the majority of citizens — this obligation is no longer 
binding in a pluralist world where the majority of citizens are non-
Catholics (Cardinal Journet and Jacques Maritain might have accepted 
this view).5 This strategy will be compatible with what I have to say, but 
my approach will avoid all of these historical subtleties and show them 
to be required only in giving an explanation of the plausibility of 
Catholic teaching.  
Finally, there are those who propose that the teaching of Vatican II 
actually does not teach that human beings have fundamental rights to 
religious liberty. Instead, Thomas Pink has argued that, while States 
continue to have a right and duty to impose the Catholic faith on citi-
zens by temporal penalties and to establish the Church, the teaching of 
Vatican II only proposes that non-Catholic citizens are not to be coerced 
directly into accepting the Catholic faith because they are not directly 
subject to the jurisdiction of Catholic Church.6 We might say that, on 
Pink’s view, there is only an “accommodationist” sense of religious lib-
erty in Dignitatis Humanae — religious liberty is only a tool of achieving 
civil peace, not a fundamental right of human beings. I will hope to 
show, to the contrary, that this complicated response is unnecessary 
and implausible. This strategy assumes that prior teaching had pro-
posed definitively binding claims concerning a duty to establish the 
Church and condemnation of a fundamental right to religious liberty. 
I will show that prior teaching did not do so, making this strategy un-
necessary. 
The proposal advanced in this article only allows us to eliminate the 
idea that there is a formal contradiction in Catholic magisterial teaching 
5. For example, see C. JOURNET, L’Eglise du Verbe Incarné, vol. 1, Editions Saint-Au-
gustin, Saint-Maurice 1998, pp. 393–395, 435–453; J. MARI TAIN, Man and the State, 
Catholic University of America Press, Washington, DC 1951, esp. pp. 147–187. 
6. I will be reviewing his position in some detail below, but see T. PINK, Jacques Mar-
itain and the Problem of Church and State, «The Thomist» 79 (2015), pp. 8–20.
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on religious freedom. In fact, I think that it is obvious that the teaching 
is consistent, especially when the doctrinal propositions are examined 
closely. Yet my argument does not conclude that it is obvious what the 
overall teaching is (I do not think it is obvious) or eliminate the need 
for theological explanation that invokes positive historical claims or de-
velopment of doctrine. However, if my argument is successful, it would 
advance the controversy over the teaching of the Church on religious 
freedom from a question whether there exists a contradiction with prior 
teaching to a question concerning how the prior and modern teaching 
are to be explained. That is, we should instead be debating the merits 
of the theological explanations of the Catholic teaching on religious 
freedom, not whether prior and contemporary claims are consistent. 
Even if proving the absence of a contradiction does not prove that the 
theory is true or plausible, then, there is value in doing so. 
For this reason, I will avoid trying to offer any theological explana-
tion or holistic account of Catholic teaching on religious freedom, or 
an explanation as to how the contemporary teaching might be a “de-
velopment” of the prior doctrinal claims, or even what approach to re-
ligious freedom might be envisioned by the authors of the 
contemporary documents. Other scholars have already offered expla-
nations of the Catholic teaching on religious freedom, with various de-
grees of comprehensiveness.7 My reason for avoiding these issues is that 
it would be perfectly possible to disagree with any or all such explana-
tions of the doctrine on religious freedom and nevertheless hold that I 
am right in claiming that the doctrinally-binding propositions from 
these documents are mutually consistent. These situations occur rela-
tively frequently in theology generally and are not surprising. For ex-
ample, one could hold there is no contradiction in the claims that the 
Three Persons are one God, even if one cannot explain how this is true 
or has no theory of persons or natures. So, one could disagree with var-
ious explanations of Trinitarian doctrine, possibly rejecting all theories 
of how Trinitarian claims are consistent, and nevertheless hold that 
those claims actually are consistent («I know not how»).  
In order to prove my claim that there exists no contradiction between 
7. Cfr. D. SCHINDLER – N. HEALY, Freedom, Truth, and Human Dignity: The Second 
Vatican Council’s Declaration on Religious Freedom, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, MI 2015. 
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Catholic teaching on religious freedom at Vatican II and the teaching 
found in classical papal encyclicals on the subject, I will appeal at var-
ious points to a political theory known as Catholic “integralism”. Those 
who have argued that there exists a contradiction in the Catholic teach-
ing on religious freedom are often advocates of the view that classical 
papal teaching required of all Catholics, as doctrinally-binding, sub-
scription to this political theory. One defender has defined this political 
theory as follows: «Catholic integralism is the position that politics 
should be ordered to the common good of human life, both temporal 
and spiritual, and that temporal and spiritual authority ought therefore 
to have an ordered relation».8 These defenders argue that integralism 
was taught and required by previous Catholic social teaching, and that 
integralism «rejects modern liberal understandings of freedom».9 If Vat-
ican II is incompatible with acceptance of integralism, the objector ar-
gues, then Vatican II contradicts prior papal teaching on religious 
freedom. (Lefebvre, cited earlier, arguably makes this inference.)  
By way of illustration, the integralist view rejects «that political au-
thority exists for the sake of the protection of individual rights, that one 
of the most important of those rights is the right of religious liberty, 
and that political authority should therefore not officially favor one re-
ligious confession more than others».10 Integralists typically argue that 
prior magisterial teaching required negating the aforementioned claims, 
making the integralist position on political theory an entailment of 
Catholic social doctrine. However, if it were true that prior magisterial 
teaching denied any rights to religious freedom, and Vatican II pro-
posed that there was such a right, as we saw that Vatican II apparently 
claimed, then Vatican II is in formal contradiction with prior teaching. 
It would clearly be an inconsistent set of propositions to hold both that 
there exists a right to religious liberty, such that the State cannot en-
8. E. WALDSTEIN, Integralism and the Logic of the Cross, «Church Life Journal», 
March 19, 2019, https://churchlifejournal.nd.edu/articles/integralism-and-the-
logic-of-the-cross/ [accessed 11 August 2020].
9. Ibidem.
10. E. WALDSTEIN, What is Integralism Today, «Church Life Journal», Oct. 31, 2018, 
https://churchlifejournal.nd.edu/articles/what-is-integralism-today/ [accessed 
11 August 11 2020].
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force the Catholic faith on citizens or penalize them for holding non-
Catholic religious views, and that the State can enforce the Catholic 
faith by civil penalties, because individual citizens have no right to re-
ligious liberty (or, only liberty to hold the “right” religious views). If 
Catholic teaching did claim both of these things, all parties should admit 
that the teaching would be incoherent.  
For this reason, I will begin my examination of the alleged contradic-
tion between contemporary and prior magisterial teaching on religious 
liberty in this manner: asking whether earlier papal teaching obliges 
Catholics to hold that “integralism” is true. I will examine the afore-
mentioned three chief classical papal encyclicals that concern Catholic 
teaching on Church and State, and which apparently condemn a right 
to religious freedom. I will show, first, that earlier teaching did not en-
tail integralist political views and then I will show how those earlier 
claims are consistent with the claims made in Dignitatis Humanae con-
cerning religious freedom. Finally, I will propose a series of counter-ex-
amples that illustrate their compatibility. In sum, then, I will have 
succeeded in demonstrating this narrow and limited thesis: that there 
is no inconsistency or incoherence in holding all of the propositions 
proposed in prior doctrinal teaching on religious freedom alongside the 
teaching proposed in Dignitatis Humanae. 
1.  PRELIMINARIES 
While I will not try to embark on the unhelpful project of “defining” 
integralism, it is helpful to clarify slightly some of the concrete propos-
als that integralists see as essential to their project. Where various au-
thors might dispute or phrase differently the general principles they 
embrace, focusing on particular proposals sets us up to consider 
whether the prior teaching entails these as a consequence. Further, get-
ting from general principles to particular proposals is not straightfor-
ward, because a hidden premise or assumption can be challenged and 
derail the inference. So, the claim made earlier in defining integralism 
as the view both that political life should aim at the common good of 
citizens and that Church and State have an ordered relation would be 
far too general to be of any use. The same would be true of any other 
general principle often invoked by integralists, whether the Church 
105
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being related to the State as soul to body, or that we are obliged as 
Catholics to recognize the Kingship of Christ in society. None of these 
claims entail any particular political models; e.g., I am free to recognize 
Christ as King of the Universe without (therefore) holding that the Pope 
ought to be king of America. For example, does “ordering” of State to 
Church require ecclesial establishment? Many integralists seem com-
mitted to this consequence, but the inference is unclear. It is impossible 
to conclude from these principles as stated to any concrete proposal. 
What is distinctive about the integralist position, and what generates 
the contradiction with Dignitatis Humanae, involves three particular 
policies. Specifically, the integralist [1] denies that it is permissible for 
a State to fail to establish the Catholic Church, taking “establishment” 
in a sense particular to integralism that goes beyond financial support 
or legal privileges. The integralist holds that the State has an obligation 
to publicly recognize a legal competence of the Catholic Church’s hi-
erarchy in matters of religion, where those decisions would impact State 
policy, and to obey the laws of the Church in promoting the true faith.11 
(Pink proposes that this is because the Church has a divine right to com-
mand the State to perform certain actions, but his explanation of why 
that relationship between Church and State exists is unnecessary for 
my purposes.) The integralist claims [2] it is impermissible for the State 
to recognize freedom of religious activity or of speech as a fundamental 
right of its citizens, whether non-Catholic or Catholic. For example, 
while the Church only has coercive authority directly concerning its 
own members, and so can penalize Catholics for expressing heretical 
views (utilizing State coercive power, according to Pink), the State 
should also limit the activities of non-Catholic bodies in order to further 
the Church’s mission.12 Similarly, then, [3] the State has a corresponding 
11. T. Pink, utilizing Suarez, argues for this juridical relationship between Church 
and State; see T. PINK, Jacques Maritain and the Problem of Church and State, «The 
Thomist» 79 (2015), pp. 8–20, esp. note 30 & 31; IDEM, The Interpretation of Dignitatis 
Humanae, «Nova et Vetera», English Edition, 11/1 (2013), pp. 106–108.  
12. See T. PINK, The Right to Religious Liberty and the Coercion of Belief, J. Keown – 
R.P. George (eds.), in Reason, Morality, and Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013, 
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199675500.003.0027: «Christian rulers might be asked [by the 
Church] to prevent non-Christian rulers from impeding Christian missions; and they 
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positive, but defeasible, duty to sanction all non-Catholic religious 
views in their public expression.13 The notion of “permissibility” em-
ployed here is understood to derive from a notion of distributive justice, 
so that a State which has policies promoting these impermissible things 
is, to that extent, an unjust State. Permissibility is here applied to States, 
not individuals. That is, the integralist does not claim individuals are 
obliged in every country to pursue all of these proposals. The integralist 
consequently holds that it is permissible in a broader sense (i.e., 
morally) for a politician or leader to compromise on these policies in 
might be asked to restrict non—Christian public worship or activity in their own lands 
in order to protect the faith of their own subjects. […] Any restrictions on such non-
Christian worship [or speech] are based instead on the authority of the Church, direct-
ing baptized rulers of the state to enforce those restrictions on the Church’s behalf. And 
their function is not to forbid non-Christian public worship altogether – that would be 
tantamount to forced conversion of the unbaptized, which is beyond the Church’s au-
thority – but to reduce its impact and thereby to protect the integrity of Christian life. 
The restrictions served to protect the Church’s mission – to limit scandal to the faith 
and reduce the exposure of Christians to non-Christian religious life and influence».
13. T. PINK, Jacques Maritain, art. cit., p. 22, note 30: «If the state is to act as the 
Church’s agent, baptismal obligations must of course take political and not merely pri-
vate form. But this is the clear implication of canon 2198 of the 1917 Code, which, like 
all canonical obligation, presupposes baptism, but puts requirements specifically on the 
state». Not every integralist takes this duty to be as expansive as P. KWASNIEWSKI, but 
see the following in his The “Catholic State”, «Latin Mass Magazine» (Fall 2014), pp. 20–
21: «Now, in a Catholic society, the extrinsic common good is all the more easily and 
widely attained due to adherence to the true religion that furnishes the sovereign and 
infallible means for attaining it. Moreover, the study of truth will be a promotion of 
naturally knowable as well as revealed truth, with the repression of natural and super-
natural errors. […] There is thus great danger of a slow drift into an increasingly worldly 
mentality, as well as the perversion and corruption of citizens by errors in faith or 
morals spread by persuasive and “charismatic” representatives of sects that manage to 
gain entrance into that society. A Catholic government that really holds the common 
good of its people at heart is therefore obliged to limit severely the public activities of 
such sectarians and the public expressions of their beliefs (e.g., to prohibit entry of such 
people or the publication of their pamphlets), while at the same time continuing to pro-
mote, in every way possible, such religious institutions as families, parishes, monaster-
ies, schools, and hospitals that keep the Faith alive and well in the hearts of the people». 
(emphasis mine).
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the current pluralist situation of many contemporary countries.14 Nev-
ertheless, to be an “ideal” or rightly ordered State requires these mea-
sures, because these are constitutive of distributive justice, rightly 
conceived.  
Consider, by contrast, the following claims in Dignitatis Humanae: 
DH 1: If, in view of peculiar circumstances obtaining among peoples, spe-
cial civil recognition is given to one religious community in the consti-
tutional order of society, it is at the same time imperative that the right 
of all citizens and religious communities to religious freedom should be 
recognized and made effective in practice (6) 
DH 2: the right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity 
of the human person […] This freedom means that all men are to be im-
mune from coercion on the part of individuals or of social groups and of 
any human power, in such wise that no one is to be forced to act in a man-
ner contrary to his own beliefs, whether privately or publicly, whether 
alone or in association with others, within due limits. […] Injury therefore 
is done to the human person and to the very order established by God for 
human life, if the free exercise of religion is denied in society, provided 
just public order is observed (2–3) 
DH 3: The freedom or immunity from coercion in matters religious which 
is the endowment of persons as individuals is also to be recognized as 
their right when they act in community. […] Religious communities also 
have the right not to be hindered in their public teaching and witness to 
their faith, whether by the spoken or by the written word (4) 
These three propositions in Dignitatis Humanae either affirm or entail 
propositions that seem incompatible with the integralist claims. DH 1 
plausibly implies that governments do not have a duty to establish the 
Catholic religion. DH 2 affirms that religious freedom is a fundamental 
right of the human person and that governments have an obligation to 
recognize that right civilly. DH 3 affirms that this right extends to re-
ligious communities as corporate rights, including freedom of speech, 
and entails that it would be unjust to suppress religious communities 
14. T. PINK, Jacques Maritain, cit., pp. 11–12: «The Leonine case for soul-body union 
as an ideal has to do not with what is currently politically feasible, which may only be 
various levels of the bad, but with what political arrangements, where Church-state re-
lations are concerned, could best ensure the good».
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merely for holding false views. In fact, that entailment is made explicit 
elsewhere: «the right to this immunity continues to exist even in those 
who do not live up to their obligation of seeking the truth and adhering 
to it and the exercise of this right is not to be impeded, provided that 
just public order be observed» (2). It is noteworthy, however, that 
Thomas Pink has argued that the integralist claims are consistent with 
Vatican II, because Dignitatis Humanae only affirms that the Catholic 
Church no longer is requiring that States enforce coercive sanctions 
against false religions.15 However, I am going to presume for my pur-
poses that Dignitatis Humanae exists in contradiction to integralist 
claims and, consequently, that if integralism were taught as Catholic 
doctrine before Dignitatis Humanae, then there would be a problem be-
cause Catholic social teaching about the State would be inconsistent.   
2.  RELEVANT CLAIMS IN MIRARI VOS, QUANTA CURA, IMMORTALE DEI 
Instances of prior magisterial Catholic teaching that potentially or al-
legedly conflicts with Dignitatis Humanae are more-or-less restricted 
to the encyclicals of various popes at the turn of the 19th century, who 
were writing in response to the rise of secularism and nationalism.16  It 
is clear that none of these social encyclicals involve clear doctrinal def-
initions of any kind, which makes all the teaching alleged to conflict 
with Vatican II a matter of the ordinary magisterium of the Roman Pon-
tiff. Such teaching is normally only understood as infallible when also 
15. T. PINK, Conscience and Coercion, «First Things», 1 August 2012, https://www. 
firstthings.com/article/2012/08/conscience-and-coercion [accessed 11 August 
2020]. See also IDEM, Dignitatis Humanae: Continuity after Leo XIII, in T. CREAN – A. 
FIMISTER (eds.), Dignitatis Humanae Colloquium, vol. 1, Dialogos Institute, Createspace 
Independent Publishing Platform, 2017, pp. 105–146; IDEM, The Right to Religious Liberty, 
op. cit.
16. A famous alternative text for these claims is Pope BONIFACE VIII’s bull Unam 
Sanctam. While there is more to say about interpretation of the claims made in that 
bull and the claims it makes about the way in which the temporal power is subordinated 
to the spiritual, it is noteworthy that Catholic theologians have disputed whether the 
claims made in that regard are properly doctrinal or definitive. See P. COLLINS, Upon 
this rock: the popes and their changing role, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Vic-
toria 2000, pp. 150–154; J.P. KIRSCH, ad v. «Unam Sanctam», in C.G. HERBERMANN (ed.), 
Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 15, Robert Appleton Company, New York 1912.
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universally taught by the Church, however, so this point about the in-
fallible character of these encyclicals is not obvious or uncontroversial.17 
In what follows, I presume that the infallibility of these encyclicals and 
the propositions apparently proposed by them as doctrinally-binding, 
leaving aside all the complicated questions of magisterial authority. In 
the process, though, I will show no such fancy footwork about authority 
is necessary to resolve the issue of how Dignitatis Humanae is consis-
tent with what is said in the encyclical tradition. If these propositions 
are consistent with modern teaching, then nothing is lost in terms of 
the consistency of Catholic teaching if the propositions proposed in the 
classical encyclicals were infallible.  
Of course, Dignitatis Humanae and its drafters were conscious of the 
existence of these encyclicals. The document therefore claims that the 
right to religious freedom proposed in Dignitatis Humanae «has to do 
with immunity from coercion in civil society» and is consistent with 
prior teaching because «it leaves untouched traditional Catholic doc-
trine on the moral duty of men and societies toward the true religion 
and toward the one Church of Christ» (no. 1).  
One finds a summary of that “traditional teaching” in the encyclical 
Immortale Dei of Leo XIII: 
… it is a public crime to act as though there were no God. So, too, is it a 
sin for the State not to have care for religion as a something beyond its 
scope, or as of no practical benefit; or out of many forms of religion to 
adopt that one which chimes in with the fancy; for we are bound abso-
lutely to worship God in that way which He has shown to be His will. All 
who rule, therefore, would hold in honour the holy name of God, and one 
of their chief duties must be to favour religion, to protect it, to shield it 
under the credit and sanction of the laws, and neither to organize nor 
enact any measure that may compromise its safety (LEO XIII, Immortale 
17. R. MILLER, questioned the binding character of Quanta Cura in Integralism and 
Catholic Doctrine, «Public Discourse», 15 July 2018, https://www.thepublicdiscourse. 
com/2018/07/22105/ [accessed 11 August 2020]. But see further A. TANQUEREY, A Man-
ual of Dogmatic Theology, trans. by J.J. Byrnes, Desclee, New York 1959, pp. 176–182. For 
an overview of these issues from a minimalist perspective on infallibility, see R. GAIL-
LARDETZ, The Ordinary Universal Magisterium: Unresolved Questions, «Theological Stud-
ies» 63 (2002), pp. 447–471. 
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Dei, no. 6).18 
These claims made by Pope Leo XIII echo explicitly the previous teach-
ing of Gregory XVI in Mirari Vos and Pius IX in Quanta Cura. Given the 
way that these three encyclicals were framed by each pope with the 
prior teaching in mind, and no integralist has (to my knowledge) argued 
that these three encyclicals are inconsistent, it is helpful to read Gre-
gory’s claims in Mirari Vos as being clarified by Pius IX and Leo XIII, 
and Leo XIII as recapitulating the content of the prior condemnations 
issued in Quanta Cura. In the interest of being succinct, I will examine 
only the social teaching in these three encyclicals, as they are most 
often quoted as being in contradiction to Vatican II’s teaching.  
Of these, Mirari Vos is the least explicit, because it gives descriptive 
claims that plausibly imply the condemnation of certain positions, but 
it is not explicit in drawing the conclusion. For example, Gregory says 
that «indifferentism [about religious truth] gives rise to the absurd and 
erroneous proposition which claims that liberty of conscience must be 
maintained for everyone» (14). He gives us some idea what “liberty of 
conscience” is envisioned in claiming that previous states all perished 
as a result of «immoderate freedom of opinion, license of free speech, 
and desire for novelty», (14), and he condemns freedom to publish any 
views whatsoever and disseminate them without any limits (15). Yet 
Gregory never clearly defines what exactly “liberty of conscience” in-
volves, outside of these indirect characterizations. Similarly, Gregory 
also claims that those desiring a «separation of Church and State» will 
not bring «happier times» than those formerly, but this is a prediction 
rather than a clear object of teaching (20). This makes it very debatable 
what particular propositions are actually taught by the encyclical. Many 
must be inferred from context or what has been left unsaid. I do not 
know of any theory of magisterial teaching on which assumptions or 
18. PIUS IX, Quanta Cura, «AAS» 3 (1867), pp. 160–167, translations available on line 
https://www.papalencyclicals.net/pius09/p9quanta.htm [accessed 11 August 2020]; 
GREGORY XVI, Mirari Vos, «AAS» 4 (1868), pp. 336–345, https://www.papalen 
cyclicals.net/greg16/g16mirar.htm [accessed 11 August 2020]; LEO XIII, Immortale 
Dei, «AAS» 18 (1885), pp. 161–180, http://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/en 
cyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_01111885_immortale-dei.html [accessed 11 Au-
gust 2020].
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vague hidden premises of any claims made in encyclicals are binding 
and authoritative Catholic teaching.  
Thankfully, Quanta Cura, by contrast with Mirari Vos, is very explicit 
in offering three carefully-worded condemnations that concern the re-
lation of State to religious liberty: 
QC 1: the best constitution of public society and (also) civil progress al-
together require that human society be conducted and governed without 
regard being had to religion any more than if it did not exist; or, at least, 
without any distinction being made between the true religion and false 
ones. (3) 
QC 2: that is the best condition of civil society, in which no duty is rec-
ognized, as attached to the civil power, of restraining by enacted penalties, 
offenders against the Catholic religion, except so far as public peace may 
require. (3) 
QC 3: liberty of conscience and worship is each man’s personal right, 
which ought to be legally proclaimed and asserted in every rightly con-
stituted society; and that a right resides in the citizens to an absolute lib-
erty, which should be restrained by no authority whether ecclesiastical 
or civil, whereby they may be able openly and publicly to manifest and 
declare any of their ideas whatever, either by word of mouth, by the press, 
or in any other way. (3) 
Finally, we can read the summary of tradition teaching given from Im-
mortale Dei as qualifying these condemnations in Quanta Cura. Immor-
tale Dei condemns as a “sin” the situation where a State should not care 
for religion or treat it as beside the appropriate objects of State concern, 
and therefore explicitly rules out State-sponsored atheism. Leo XIII also 
implies that it is impermissible to treat the civil establishment of reli-
gion as a matter of indifference to the truth of that religion, which such 
indifferentism displays itself in the State thinking  
it is not obliged to make public profession of any religion; or to inquire 
which of the very many religions is the only one true; or to prefer one re-
ligion to all the rest; or to show to any form of religion special favour; 
but, on the contrary, is bound to grant equal rights to every creed, so that 
public order may not be disturbed by any particular form of religious be-
lief (25). 
Leo also claims that, as a consequence, «the unrestrained freedom of 
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thinking and of openly making known one’s thoughts is not inherent 
in the rights of citizens, and is by no means to be reckoned worthy of 
favour and support» (35). Finally, Leo affirms a positive duty for the 
State to favor and protect religion, such that the State also has negative 
duties not to enact laws that disfavor religion. The negative duty is il-
lustrated by cases where the Church is excluded from civil society and 
education (29–33). The positive duty is clarified as nevertheless being 
incompatible with coercion that would force people to embrace Catholi-
cism against their will; nor does the positive duty rule out a ruler per-
mitting multiple religions to co-exist in the State, but only that the 
Church «deems it unlawful to place the various forms of divine worship 
on the same footing as the true religion …» (36).  
3.  CONSISTENCY WI TH VATICAN II’S DIGNITATIS HUMANAE 
It should be seen, first, that these three encyclicals do not entail specif-
ically integralist policies, even if they adopt principles that are perhaps 
relatively illiberal. It is consistently proposed that a State has a negative 
duty to avoid treating religion as a matter of indifference, as not im-
portant for its citizens, or treating all religions as fundamentally equal 
without respect to their truth or falsity. It is also consistently proposed 
that the State has a positive duty to favor, protect, and perform various 
other tasks to allow religion to accomplish its proper activity. But it is 
nowhere claimed that the State has to establish the Church in the sense 
required by the integralist proposal. Nor is it plausible to infer from the 
claim that the State must favor and protect the true religion that the 
State is required to recognize the Church hierarchy’s ability to dictate 
State policies, or that the State has an obligation to follow the direction 
of the Church in promoting the Catholic religion. A State that professed 
the true faith with an acknowledgement in the State’s constitution, for 
example, and protected the Church’s hierarchy to accomplish their re-
ligious activities alongside other religious bodies, without having any 
provision for civil effects of Catholic canon law, is not in obvious vio-
lation of any of the encyclical tradition’s condemnations. Such a State 
would not be treating religion as a matter of indifference.19 Thus, the 
19. For a similar line of reasoning employed by Cardinal Journet at the Second Vat-
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first integralist proposal, establishment, is not required by these en-
cyclicals. 
Nor is the second integralist proposal, that the State cannot permis-
sibly recognize any fundamental right to religious liberty or free speech, 
required by these encyclicals. It is true that QC 3 condemns a «liberty 
of conscience and worship is each man’s personal right, which ought 
to be legally proclaimed and asserted in every rightly constituted soci-
ety», but it is not obvious from the first part of the condemned propo-
sition what liberty of conscience or worship is condemned. In 
considering the latter part of that same condemned proposition, one 
finds a qualification that such a right to liberty would be one «restrained 
by no authority whether ecclesiastical or civil», etc. Leo XIII and Gre-
gory XVI respectively qualify as unrestrained or immoderate freedom 
the kind of liberty of worship, conscience, or speech that each con-
demns. If we understand each of these three encyclicals to clarify the 
thought of the others, the overall condemnation aims not at any right 
of liberty of conscience or worship, but the specific type foreseen in the 
encyclicals – that is, a right unrestricted by any norms or authority that 
would set limits to its free exercise. These claims are then quite com-
patible with the proposal that human beings have an inherent right to 
religious worship, conscience, or speech that is not unrestrained or im-
moderate.  
Nor is the third integralist proposal, that the State has a positive (if 
defeasible) duty to sanction all non-Catholic religions in their public 
expression, entailed by any of the above. QC 2 seems to imply a positive 
duty «of restraining by enacted penalties, offenders against the Catholic 
religion» beyond the scope of what public peace requires. But, first, Leo 
XIII explicitly allows the presence of other religions in a just state, not 
apparently as a concession to practicalities, but as a matter of justice. 
The State is then not under a positive duty to sanction any and all false 
religions. Leo’s qualification that this duty to restrict offenders is set in 
the context of the positive duty of the State to favor and protect the 
true religion, such that the other religions are permitted as long as the 
Catholic religion is given a privileged “footing”, does not require much 
ican Council, see the citations and analysis in M. RHONHEIMER, Dignitatis Humanae – 
Not a Mere Question of Church Policy, «Nova et Vetera» 12/2 (2014), pp. 461–462.
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in the way of sanction at all. Second, it is apparent that there are im-
portant qualifications in QC 2’s condemnation. When rephrased posi-
tively, QC 2 could affirm a position as follows: «a duty is recognized, 
as attached to the civil power, of restraining by enacted penalties, of-
fenders against the Catholic religion, beyond what [mere] public peace 
may require». Clearly, the claim that offenders against Catholicism are 
to be sanctioned beyond merely what public peace requires does not 
require anything like the sanctioning of any or all false religions. On 
one side, what is required «beyond mere public peace» is not clear, but 
it surely is not plausible to understand this qualification to oblige the 
State to enact any penalties against any or all non-Catholic religions. 
On the other, the claim only sanctions offenders against Catholicism. 
It is not a positive duty, for example, to sanction any and all non-
Catholic religion merely in virtue of being non-Catholic. In sum, on any 
plausible and obvious reading, the encyclical tradition does not plausi-
bly entail the integralist position about State duties to sanction non-
Catholic faiths.   
That said, the text of Dignitatis Humanae contains other affirmations 
that might seem hard to square with the teaching of the prior encyclical 
tradition. I have shown that the condemnation of a right to religious 
liberty in the previous teaching was always qualified by such phrases 
as “immoderate” or “unrestricted” liberty. DH 2 explicitly qualifies its 
affirmation of a right to religious liberty with similar language: it af-
firms a liberty «within due limits». Thus, the right to religious freedom, 
worship, and speech are, in their exercise,  
subject to certain regulatory norms. In the use of all freedoms the moral 
principle of personal and social responsibility is to be observed. In the ex-
ercise of their rights, individual men and social groups are bound by the 
moral law to have respect both for the rights of others and for their own 
duties toward others and for the common welfare of all (7). 
Echoing explicitly Immortale Dei, Dignitatis Humanae qualifies its 
claims of a civil right to religious freedom by affirming that «all men 
are bound to seek the truth, especially in what concerns God and His 
Church, and to embrace the truth they come to know, and to hold fast 
to it» (no. 1) and that this applies to human societies as much as to in-
dividuals. DH 1 thus envisions the possibility that a State can, even 
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while respecting this fundamental right on the part of all citizens to re-
ligious freedom, give special constitutional recognition to the Catholic 
Church. 
Nevertheless, there remain two issues. The first is in what way the 
teaching of Vatican II is compatible with the claims of the encyclical 
tradition that Catholicism is to be favored by the State. The claims out-
lined in DH 1-3 extend mostly to protection, non-interference, and lack 
of coercion, allowing the Church to perform its own duties without hin-
drance by the State. While it would be true, if we assume the obligations 
of a State to religious freedom proposed by Dignitatis Humanae, that 
the State could not favor Catholicism in many ways, it is not true that 
the declaration rules out any such manner of favoring the faith. Here 
it seems to me the declaration is mainly silent, aside from the claim 
made in DH 1 that such favor could occur by a special constitutional 
recognition. It seems to me nevertheless that the encyclical tradition 
mandates no specific measures that States are obliged to take to favor 
the Catholic religion. In that way, the teaching of Dignitatis Humanae 
cannot be understood to conflict with the prior teaching, if the prior 
teaching outlines nothing more than a general duty to favor the true 
religion. 
The second issue is the question of a recognized civil right to religious 
liberty. DH affirms that «this right of the human person to religious 
freedom is to be recognized in the constitutional law whereby society 
is governed and thus it is to become a civil right» (2). We might think 
the declaration on religious liberty on this point comes into conflict 
with QC 1, which condemned that the «best constitution of society» 
would require government «without any distinction being made be-
tween the true religion and false ones» (3). But the claims are not ob-
viously inconsistent: why think a recognized right to freedom of 
conscience, speech, or worship means that no distinctions are made be-
tween religions? The claim that a contradiction is latent here requires 
some appeal outside the texts, perhaps appealing to an implicit position 
that a right to religious freedom, especially if fundamental, can only be 
proposed in the context of a “liberal” theory of government. But a right 
to religious liberty is not the exclusive purview of Lockeans or Rawl-
sians, and it is fallacious to think so.  
On one hand, it is just a fact that hardly any mainstream political phi-
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losophy, let alone real-world government, allows untrammeled freedom 
of worship or speech. Cults have been sanctioned or prohibited by 
many secular governments for noxious public morals, and even in the 
US, where freedom of worship and speech is considered a fundamental 
right, the exercise of that right is subject to well-known legal limits. 
The distinction made by governments at times do appeal to an objective 
moral order that implies or entails the falsity of beliefs held by the cult 
in question. And the declaration does not specifically say what kinds 
of distinctions need to be made. On the other, it is quite open to us to 
interpret both QC 1–2 as only condemning the affirmation that the 
“best” condition of society requires that no distinction is made between 
true and false faiths. Condemnations, such as those of QC, are under-
stood in the Catholic theological tradition to be applied strictly. One 
could then hold that there exists no one best condition of society at all; 
as long as none are publicly atheistic, unjust in treatment of religions, 
or treat religion as unimportant in civil life, perhaps some societies 
justly and rightly establish the Catholic faith, whereas others do not, 
and none are intrinsically the “best” form of civil society. Even this (ad-
mittedly far-fetched) position does not seem to me to fall within the 
scope of the condemned proposition.  
4.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The point of the latter far-fetched counter-example is that there is quite 
a lot of interpretative room in reading the prior encyclical tradition, 
such that finding a strict contradiction between those condemnations 
and the affirmations in Dignitatis Humanae is not easy or obvious. 
Showing their consistency only requires finding a counter-example of 
a position that does not fall afoul of the condemnations, and this task 
is relatively simple. What is not simple or obvious is coming up with a 
consistent account of how to understand the right of religious liberty 
proposed by Vatican II. While there is already good work being done 
to show how religious liberty is understood from a Catholic theological 
perspective, more needs to be done in specifically political philosophy 
to show how a traditionally perfectionist political philosophy is com-
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patible with religious/philosophical pluralism.20 In addition, the claims 
that the State has a positive duty to favor the Catholic faith have not 
been appreciated. Clearly, Vatican II was aware of this part of the en-
cyclical tradition, as illustrated in their prefatory appeal to prior teach-
ing on the duties of the State, even though they never explained how 
such duties are to be exemplified in the context of modern pluralist 
states. There is much theological work to be done constructing a con-
temporary political theology that makes sense of this and offers con-
crete solutions for Catholics in an increasingly hostile secularized 
world.
20. E.g., T.J. WHITE, The Right to Religious Freedom: Thomistic Principles of Nature 
and Grace, «Nova et Vetera», English edition, 13/4 (2015), pp. 1149–1184. 
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